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COMBATING IMPUNITY:
CONTRACTOR LIABILITY FOR
TORTURE DURING TIMES OF WAR
UNDER THE WARTIME SUSPENSION OF
LIMITATIONS ACT
CLAIRE JABBOUR*
This Comment focuses its analysis on the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act and how it applies to military contractors who commit
crimes during times of war. This Comment argues that the Wartime
Suspension of Limitations Act, as modified in 2008, applies to the
offense of torture if committed during the Iraq and/or Afghanistan
conflicts. Applying the 2008 modification of the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act does not violate the rule against ex post facto
applications of law because the statute of limitations on torture would
not have expired by 2008; therefore, there is no retroactive application.
This Comment looks at the current lay of the land surrounding military
contractor liability. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that military
contractors enjoy near-impunity, both criminally and civilly, under the
current law. In the few circuits where military contractors have been
held civilly liable, there continues to be uncertainty about the future
stability of the decision.
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INTRODUCTION
The definition of war has changed since World War II-the last
officially declared war-ended in the 1940s. During World War II,
Congress enacted the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("the
WSLA" or "the Act") to give the government time to bring charges against
contractors who defrauded the government.' In 2008, Congress redefined
war under the WSLA to include a modem interpretation; war is not limited
to official declarations, but it also includes congressional or presidential
2
authorizations of military force. Numerous wars have occurred between
the end of WWII and 2008, all without formal declarations of war by
Congress.3
Despite the changing nature of war, in 2015, the Supreme Court heard its
first case regarding the WSLA since the 1950s. In the 1950s, Bridges v.
1. See S. REP. No. 110-431, pt. 1, at 1-2 (2008) ("This legislation will protect
American taxpayers from criminal contractor fraud by giving investigators and auditors
the time they need to thoroughly review contracts related to the ongoing conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan.").
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2008) ("When the United States is at war or Congress
has enacted a specific authorization for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. [§] 1544(b)).").
3. See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the use of military
force in Iraq and Afghanistan); Official Declarations of War by Congress, UNITED
STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/hmultisectionsand_
teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
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United States and United States v. Grainger both held that fraud was an
essential element for the WSLA to apply.4
Additionally, military contractors have not consistently been held
criminally liable for crimes committed while performing a government
contract abroad during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 5 However,
military contractors feel that they are being held accountable because civil
cases have been filed, and courts are unwilling to dismiss most of these
cases outright.6 Currently, military contractors, who are facing criticism,
have created a practice of changing the name of their company to acquire
new government contracts and circumventing liability.
7
This Comment will raise a number of arguments: 1) that a plain meaning
reading of the WSLA expands the Act's reach beyond defrauding the
government to include other crimes that are also in the government's
interest; 2) that military contractor liability currently is uncertain for crimes
like torture; and 3) that courts should apply the Carter8 decision and the
plain language reading of the WSLA to Al Shimari9 to establish a precedent
4. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 232-33 (1953); United States v.
Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1953).
5. See The Editorial Board, Will Anyone Pay for Abu Ghraib?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/20l5/02/05/opinion/will-anyone-pay-for-abu-ghrai
b.html?_r-l (stating that only low level officers have been held accountable for torture
in Abu Ghraib, but contractors that gave orders for torture have not been held
criminally or civilly liable); see also FAR 9.103 (2015) (dictating the policy behind
awarding government contracts to outside contractors); FAR 9.104-1 (2015) (noting the
factors to consider to determine if a potential contractor is responsible for the purpose
of the meeting the reliability requirement); FAR 9.406-2 (2015) (highlighting that a
contractor may be ineligible to receive a government contract if the contractor has
committed an offense that questions professional responsibility and integrity).
6. See Stephen Vladeck, Military Contractor Liability Returns to the Supreme
Court, LAWFARE BLOG (June 11, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/
06/military-contractor-liability-returns-to-the-supreme-court/ (arguing that military
contractors are attempting to ask the Supreme Court for a precedent rule that provides
them with immunity and bars civil liability claims).
7. See Nathan Hodge, Company Once Known as Blackwater Ditches Xe for Yet
Another New Name, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052970204319004577089021757803802 (rebranding Xe Services to
Academi and changing the leadership of the original Blackwater); Mark Landler &
Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Still Using Security Firm it Broke With, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2 1,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/22/us/22intel.html? r-0 (highlighting that
Blackwater changed its name in 2009 to Xe to continue performance on a government
contract).
8. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-
1497, 1 (U.S. May 26, 2015) (holding that the WSLA can be applied criminally and
not civilly).
9. Al Shimari v. CACI Primier Tech., Inc., No. l:08-cv-00827-GBL-JFA, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107511 (E.D. Va. 2015) (Abu Ghraib prison torture case).
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for consistent application of military contractor liability. 0 Finally, this
Comment will briefly highlight military contractor liability under other
statutes. 1
I. WARTIME CRIMINALS: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS
TO OVERCOME IMPUNITY
Since WSLA's enactment, it has been modified and extended several
times. 1 2 The lower courts have analyzed the WSLA a limited number of
times, 1 3 and the Supreme Court has analyzed the WSLA a handful of
times. 14
A. When a Bill Becomes a Law. The Passing of the WSLA
In 1942, Congress passed an act suspending the statute of limitations for
crimes involving defrauding the government to last until July 1945.15 In
1944, Congress amended the Act to extend the minimum amount of time
before a statute of limitations can begin to run during times of war to a time
following the termination of war.' 6 This gave the government more time to
10. See id. at *1-3 (E.D. Va. 2015) (determining courts do not have jurisdiction to
question military decisions); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516,
530-31 (4th Cir. 2014) (favoring military contractor liability over impunity).
11. See discussion infra Part III.B (showing that there is uncertainty for military
contractor liability following the Court's holding in Kiobel).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2008) (changing the term "times of war" to include
Congressionally authorized use of force); Act of June 28, 1948, Pub. L. No. 82-645 ch.
213, sec. 3287, 62 Stat. 683, 828 (1948) (amending the WSLA to apply during all times
of war, not just World War II); Surplus Property Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-457, ch.
479, sec. 28, 58 Stat. 767, 781 (1944) (including crimes committed under the Surplus
Property Act of 1944); Contract Settlement Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-395, ch. 358,
sec. 19(b), 58 Stat. 649, 667 (1944) (extending the suspension of statutes of limitations
under WSLA until the termination of World War II); Act of Aug. 24, 1942, Pub. L. No.
77-706, ch. 555, 56 Stat. 747, 747-48 (1942) (passing the WSLA, which allowed for
the suspension of the tolling of statutes of limitations until 1945).
13. See generally United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 2008)
(including conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq as wars under the WSLA); United States v.
Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (arguing that the Persian Gulf Conflict
did not constitute war for purposes of the WSLA because Congress intended the statute
to apply only in times of war that completely consumed and preoccupied the federal
government resulting in inability to efficiently prosecute violators of statutes).
14. See generally United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225 (1952) (limiting the WSLA
to crimes committed during times of war, not before or after); Bridges v. United States,
346 U.S. 209 (1953) (limiting the definition of fraud to pecuniary fraud); United States
v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235 (1953) (creating a two-prong test for the WSLA to apply,
which stated there must be a violation of a statute that is pecuniary and that violation
must have occurred before end of hostilities).
15. 56 Stat. at 747-48.
16. See 58 Stat. at 667 (noting that statutes of limitations are "suspended until
three years after the termination of hostilities in the present war as proclaimed by the
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adjudicate crimes committed during war on the basis that the government
had been preoccupied by war when the crimes were committed.' 7 Congress
amended the Act again to include offenses related to the Surplus Property
Act of 1944 ("Surplus Property Act"). 18
In 1948, Congress amended the WSLA for the first time. The WSLA
replaced the option of crimes committed in connection with the Surplus
Property Act' 9 with a broader interpretation that considered crimes
"committed in connection with the acquisition, care, handling, custody,
control or disposition of any real or personal property of the United
States .... 20 This broadening allowed other property crimes committed
against the United States to be prosecuted criminally rather than limiting
liability only to violations of the Surplus Property Act.2'
From 1948 to 2008, Congress did not touch the WSLA, and it did not
use the Act because Congress had not declared war since World War 11.22
However, Congress modified the WSLA in 2008: during the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq.23 Both the United States Supreme Court and the
lower courts have attempted to analyze the WSLA in its various forms with
varying results.
President or by... the two Houses of Congress").
17. Smith, 342 U.S. at 228-29; Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49.
18. Surplus Property Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-457, ch. 479, sec. 28, 58 Stat.
649, 781 (1944) (amending the WSLA to reflect laws enacted in response to
congressional concerns of crimes committed during acts of war such as contractors
keeping property bought by the government for use during war but left over after the
end of war).
19. Act of June 28, 1948, Pub. L. No. 82-645 ch. 213, sec. 3287, 62 Stat. 683, 828
(1948); see Surplus Property Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-457, ch. 479, sec. 28, 58 Stat.
767, 781 (1944) (specifying only crimes committed in violation of the Surplus Property
Act of 1944).
20. 62 Stat. at 828.
21. Id.; see 58 Stat. at 781 (applying a prong of the WSLA only to violations of the
Surplus Property Act of 1944).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2008) (amending the WSLA for the first time since
1948); 62 Stat. at 828 (amending the WSLA for the last time before 2008); United
States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 225-26 (1952) (applying the WSLA to a crime
committed after the end of World War II); United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132,
1135 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (addressing congressional intent behind the WSLA for the first
time since the 1950s by noting that Congress intended the WSLA to only apply to
pervasive wars); see also UNITED STATES SENATE, Official Declarations of War by
Congress, supra note 3.
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (modifying the WSLA to apply to congressionally
authorized wars).
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B. The Courts Intervene. The State of Affairs During the 1940s and
1950s
The Supreme Court has heard few WSLA cases. The first case, in 1952,
was United States v. Smith, where the appellee committed forgery and
check fraud two years after the end of World War 11.24 The Court held that
the WSLA only applied to crimes committed during times of war and not
crimes that occurred before or after the declared war.25  The Court
determined that the purpose of the WSLA is to allow the government
sufficient times to prosecute when busy with war. Therefore, because the
actions of the defendant had occurred after the war, the WSLA did not
apply.
26
In 1953, the Court heard two WSLA cases on the same day: Bridges v.
United States and United States v. Grainger. In Bridges, the petitioners
lied under oath at a naturalization hearing about whether the applicant was
a communist.27  The events in Bridges took place after the second
amendment to the WSLA in 1944.28 The Court held that the WSLA only
applied to crimes of pecuniary fraud and noted that lying under oath, while
considered to be defrauding the government, was not pecuniary." The
Court reasoned that the WSLA should be interpreted conservatively
because it carves out an exception to bringing cases swiftly and
efficiently.
30
In Grainger, the defendants were indicted for providing false claims that
items had been purchased to the Community Credit Corporation in an
attempt to obtain funds. 31 The Court held the WSLA applies where the
crime committed was 1) pecuniary; and 2) was committed before the
official termination of war.32 Accordingly, fraud and conspiracy to commit
fraud were enough to trigger the WSLA on this occasion. 33 Additionally,
24. Smith, 342 U.S. at 225-26.
25. Id. at 228.
26. Id.
27. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 211-12 (1953).
28. Surplus Property Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-457, ch. 479, see. 28, 58 Stat.
767, 781 (1944); id. at 211.
29. Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215 (limiting the WSLA to "offenses involving the
defrauding of the United States... where the fraud is of a pecuniary nature or at
least... concerning property").
30. Id. at 215-16.
31. United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 240 (1953).
32. Id. at 243-44; see also Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215 (holding that the WSLA only
applies to crimes of fraud that are pecuniary in nature).
33. Grainger, 346 U.S. at 244 (arguing that "the combination of either falsity,
fiction, or fraud with the claim. . . applies to a conspiracy to commit fraud").
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the statute of limitations would not begin running until three years after the
war ended because the President officially declared that the war ended after
the crimes occurred; therefore, the defendants could have been indicted for
fraud.
34
Since 1956, the Supreme Court has not heard a case analyzing the
WSLA. Interpretation has been left up to the judges of the lower courts,
who have taken up the challenge.
C. Sibling Rivalry 101: The Lower Courts Split on the Wartime
Suspension ofLimitations Act
The lower courts have taken opposing sides when analyzing the WSLA.
In United States v. Shelton, the District Court for the Western District of
Texas held that the Persian Gulf War did not constitute a war because
Congress did not officially declare war.35 The court focused on the fact
that Congress intended the WSLA to apply to all-encompassing conflicts
that completely preoccupy the government, such as World War 11.36 The
court further noted that the WSLA was not used by the government during
the Vietnam War, which was overbearing enough to trigger the WSLA, and
it found the Persian Gulf War to be similar to the Vietnam War.
37
Conversely, in United States v. Prosperi, the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts held that the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan each constituted wars under the WSLA.38 The court argued
that, under the plain meaning of the WSLA, the term "at war" is broader
than declared wars because Congress did not specify "at war" only applied
to congressionally declared wars.39 The court created a factors test to
determine if a conflict constitutes time of war:
(1) the extent of the authorization given by Congress to the President to
act; (2) whether the conflict is deemed a "war" under accepted
definitions of the term and the rules of international law; (3) the size and
scope of the conflict (including the cost of the related procurement
effort); and (4) the diversion of resources that might have been expanded
on investigation frauds against the government.
40
34. Id. at 245-47.
35. United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (W.D. Tex. 1993). Contra
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1328 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the phrase "time
of war" in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not require a war to be officially
declared by Congress and that the Persian Gulf War constituted a war for the purpose
of the FTCA).
36. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. at 1135.
37. See id.
38. United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 454-55 (D. Mass. 2008).
39. Id. at 444, 446.
40. Id. at 449.
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The court noted that the reasoning behind the WSLA's enactment was that
the government is too preoccupied during times of war to be able to
41prosecute fraud cases.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California
reviewed the Prosperi decision and came to the opposite conclusion. In
United States v. Western Titanium, Inc., the court, much like the Shelton
court, held the term "at war" was limited to congressionally declared
wars.42 According to the court, the initial Prosperi decision created too
much uncertainty regarding what constitutes war.43 The court drew support
from the fact that statutes of limitations are typically narrowly construed in
consideration of fairness; therefore, "times of war" should be narrowly
construed. 4
Following the enactment of the 2008 amendment, Congress required the
courts to consider whether the legislative addition of authorized uses of
force applied to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In United States v.
BNP Paribas, the court held that the WSLA does apply to the conflicts and
determined that the United States was indeed at war in 2005. 4 5 The court
reasoned that United States v. Pfluger stated that the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq did not, in fact, end in 2005; therefore, the statute of limitations
could not have begun to toll.46 The 2008 amendment, therefore, did apply
to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq because the statute of limitations on
the False Claims Act claim had not run between the criminal offense in
2005 and the 2008 amendment.47
41. Id.
42. United States v. W. Titanium, Inc., No. 08-CR-4229-JLS, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65786, *10 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2010).
43. See id. at *17 (stating that the uncertainty which results from the Prosperi
approach is completely at odds with the objectives of finality, notice, and prompt
investigation sought to be served by a criminal statute of limitations).
44. Id. at *9-10.
45. United States v. BNP Paribas SA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 589, 603, 606 (S.D. Tex.
2012).
46. Compare BNP Paribas, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (arguing that neither the
toppling of the Afghan government in 2001 nor President Bush's declaration that the
fighting in Iraq ended in 2003 satisfied the requirements of the WSLA), with United
States v. Pfluger, 685 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the plain meaning of the
Act requires specific provisions to be met when terminating hostilities).
47. BNP Paribas, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08; see also United States v. Latimer,
No. CR-11-384-R, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41854, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 27, 2012)
(agreeing with the court in BNP Paribas that statutes of limitations for crimes
committed in 2006 could be tolled under the WSLA because the statute of limitations
had not expired. Therefore, no expostfacto issue exists.).
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D. The Return of the Supreme Court in United States v. Carter
In the years following the 2008 amendment, the Supreme Court heard a
48case relating to military contractors in Iraq. In 2005, a military
contractor, Kellogg Brown, & Root Services ("KBR"), had a contract to
provide services for United States. troops in Iraq. 49 As part of its contract,
KBR purified water for the troops, which Carter (the relator-a person
related to a case party) tested.50 KBR told Carter to submit fraudulent and
inaccurate timesheets so that KBR could overbill the government.5' Carter
later brought a claim against KBR under the False Claims Act, alleging that
KBR defrauded the government.52
The Fourth Circuit held that the WSLA does not require a congressional
declaration of war, and the war in Iraq constituted war under the WSLA.53
The court noted that Congress decides when a war begins,54 and because
Congress did not include the term "declared" in the text of the statute, there
was no formal declaration requirement.55 The Fourth Circuit held that
neither the President nor Congress had declared an end to hostilities when
the crimes in Carter occurred; therefore, either version of the statute is
56applicable. Further, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that a person related to
the plaintiff or defendant ("a relator") could bring a claim under the WSLA
because it allows fraud against the United States to be prosecuted.
57
Following further appeals, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the
WSLA only applies to criminal offenses. 58 However, the Court did not rule
on defining "at war" nor did the Court rule whether the 2008 amendment
extended to the entire Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.59
When brought before the Supreme Court, the New England Legal
Foundation submitted an amicus brief that reasoned that the WSLA
48. See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-
1497, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 26, 2015) (noting the case was argued on January 13,
2015).
49. United States ex rel. Carter v. Haliburton Co., 710 F. 3d 171, 174 (4th Cir.
2013).
50. Id. at 174-75.
51. Id. at 175.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 178.
54. Id. at 176 (quoting Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231 (1959)).
55. Id. at 177.
56. Id. at 179.
57. Id. at 180.
58. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-
1497, at 1 (U.S. May 26, 2015).
59. Id. at 3.
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continued to apply to fraud offenses, both pre- and post-2008 amendment;
therefore, there should be no argument on whether the types of offenses
covered have changed. 60 However, the Supreme Court ultimately held that
the WSLA only applies to criminal cases, thereby excluding the need to
decide on the application of the WSLA to crimes committed during the
Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts before the 2008 amendment. 6' The
implications of limiting the WSLA to criminal cases could include liability
for military contractors or monetary savings for military contractors if
cases like these are automatically dismissed. The Court did not rule on
defining "at war," nor did the Court rule whether the 2008 amendment
extended to the entire Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.62
II. ARE MILITARY CONTRACTORS LIABLE? DEFINING WARTIME CRIMES
BEYOND FRAUD IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
Military contractor liability for crimes committed during times of war is
still uncertain, thereby providing impunity for contractors. 63 To combat the
issue of impunity, the WSLA should be interpreted using the ordinary
64
canons of statutory construction.
A. To Fraudulence and Beyond: Based on the Plain Meaning Cannon
of Construction, What Does the WSLA Really Cover?
Congress originally limited the WSLA to crimes of fraud; however,
Congress extended the WSLA's reach to encompass property, fraud, or
crimes committed in the performance of contracts.65 The "or" separating
the three subsections connotes that only one of the claims is required for
the WSLA to apply, leaving no requirement for fraud as an essential
element.66
60. Brief for New England Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171 (4th Cir.
2013), rev'd sub nom. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Carter, No. 12-1497 (U.S. May 26, 2015).
61. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 12-1497, slip op. at 10-11 (U.S. May
26, 2015).
62. See generally Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 12-1497 (U.S. May 26,
2015).
63. See The Editorial Board, supra note 5 (stating military contractors are not held
liable for torture under current laws).
64. Cf INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that legislative intent and other canons of interpretation are unnecessary when
the statute is clear).
65. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2008); Act of June 28, 1948, Pub. L. No. 82-
645 ch. 213, sec. 3287, 62 Stat. 683, 828 (1948); Surplus Property Act of 1944, Pub. L.
No. 78-457, ch. 479, sec. 28, 58 Stat. 767, 781 (1944).
66. See id. (listing crimes committed in connection with performance of the
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There have been a few cases that have analyzed the WSLA, and of those
few, none discussed the third subsection: offenses that deal with the
contract. In fact, all of the cases that discuss the WSLA applied the Act
67only to cases of fraud. When analyzing a statute, if the plain meaning of
a statute is unambiguous, then the court needs not continue analyzing the
statute. The terms of the statute are assumed to include any and all of
Congress' legislative intent of what is to be included and what is to be
excluded in the statute.69 If the statute is clear, then a court does not need
to turn to legislative history to analyze the law.70 When the Prosperi court
examined the WSLA, the court only found the terms "at war" to be
ambiguous. 71 The WSLA can toll other offenses that meet the third
72subsection, provided that the offenses are criminal in nature.
In examining the WSLA, the term "or" is a connector between three
separate elements. A reasonable person reads the term "or" to represent an
option between two or more clauses, words, or statements.73 Therefore, the
contract).
67. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215 (1953) (holding that the
WSLA only applies to offenses that defraud the government). See generally United
States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235 (1953) (holding that fraud must be essential element
of the crime in order to qualify for tolling of statute of limitations under the WSLA).
68. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979) (emphasizing that
statutory interpretation is a step by step process); cf Maxine D. Goodman,
Reconstructing the Plain Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65
MONT. L. REV. 229 (2004) (discussing plain meaning rule, including issues and how to
modify rule).
69. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962) (determining that the terms
of the Federal Tort Claims Act are the precise terminology that Congress intended).
70. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Scalia, J., Concurring)
(noting that, since statutory interpretation is a step-by-step process, the interpreter
should not continue to the next step if the statute is clear); United States v. Prosperi,
573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444 (D. Mass. 2008) (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534
U.S. 438, 461-62 (2002)); see also BRYAN A. GARNER & ANTONIN SCALIA, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (arguing for textualist
interpretation of legal materials).
71. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45 (mentioning that Congress may have
multiple definitions of term "at war," making it the only portion of the statute, that is
vague).
72. See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-
1497, slip op. at 10-11 (U.S. May 26, 2015) (holding that the WSLA only applies to
criminal offenses).
73. See Or, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/or?s=t (last
visited Jan. 24, 2015) (defining the term "or" as a term "used to connect words,
phrases, or clauses representing alternatives"); cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP
P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 832 (3d ed. 2001) (including
discussions on how legislation is made and process of how a statute is created).
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WSLA applies to three different offenses: fraud, property, or contract.74
The final subsection should be broken down and read as providing a broad
range of options for offenses.7 5 Breaking down the third element, the first
part provides for a range of options for offenses: "committed in connection
with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance, payment for,
interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or settlement .... ,,76
A reasonable person would read the list as giving the option to select one of
these applications. The second prong provides a list of three options: "any
contract, subcontract, or purchase order,, 7 7 again connected by the term
"'or," to mean that the offense must be derived either from an issue falling
under the first range of options or from an issue falling under the second
range of options relates the first prong.7 8 This analysis is similar to the first
portion because the terms and connectors are the same-commas between
each option followed by an "or"-allowing a reasonable person to assume
that it is proper to select one option from the list. 79  The second list,
however, has a limit: the option selected must be "connected with or related
to the prosecution of the war or directly connected with or related to the
authorized use of the Armed Forces, or with any disposition of termination
inventory by any war contractor .... ,,80 Provided that the offense fits into
all three parameters of the third subsection, the WSLA applies as based on
the plain meaning interpretation.
The extension of the WSLA applies as a tolling statute to the entirety of
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2008) (listing options as "(1) involving fraud or
attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner.., or
(2) committed in connection with the acquisition, care, handling, custody, control or
disposition of any real or personal property of the United States, or (3) committed in
connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance, payment for,
interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or settlement, of any contract,
subcontract, or purchase order which is... related to the prosecution of the war... ").
75. See id. (stating that one prong notes that the crime must have been "(3)
committed in connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance,
payment for, interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or settlement, of any
contract, subcontract, or purchase order which is connected with or related to the
prosecution of the war or directly connected with or related to the authorized use of the
Armed Forces, or with any disposition of termination inventory by any war
contractor... .
76. Id.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3287.
78. See id. (numbering three options of applicability separated by "or"s); cf Or,
DICTIONARY.COM, supra note 73 (highlighting the definition of the term or as a
connector); cf ESKRIDGE, supra note 73 (discussing ways by which statutes are created
and how legislative intent factors into wording).
79. Cf Or, DICTIONARY.COM, supra note 73 (defining the term "or"); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 77 (noting various theories about legislative intent).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3287.
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Title 18. According to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, fraud is no longer an essential element required to trigger the
WSLA under a violation of the False Claims Act. 81 The court reasoned that
the requirement of fraud as an essential element did not stem from the
WSLA but from fraud offenses under the False Claims Act, which has
since been amended to no longer require fraud as an essential element.
82
Applying the court's opinion, and based on a plain-text reading of the
statute, the suggestion that fraud is no longer an essential element allows
for a more broad application of the WSLA to other types of criminal
offenses that fit the criteria outlined in other subsections of the Act.
83
B. What is Torture? How Does the International Definition of Torture
Apply Domestically? What Is the Current Lay of the Land
Regarding Military Contractor Liability for Torture?
Under a plain reading of the WSLA, the statute applies more broadly
than just to cases of pecuniary fraud. 84 The current legal setting is not ripe
for prosecution of torture under other statutes and has currently led to
military contractor impunity rather than liability.
The WSLA should apply to the offense of torture because torture is
codified in Title 18 of the United States Code.85 Here, Congress defines
torture as "an act committed by a person acting under the color of law
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
81. United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d 9, 43
(D.D.C. 2014).
82. Id.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (requiring the violation to have occurred during a war or
approved use of military force); cf United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports
Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d. at 43 (holding that since fraud is no longer an essential element
of the False Claims Act, it is not necessarily an essential element for the WSLA); Brief
for Petitioner, United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co. at 2, 710 F.3d 171 (4th
Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Carter, (No. 12-1497) 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3195, at *36-37 (arguing that the
phrase "any offense" should be defined as criminal offense because the WSLA is found
in Title 18, which contains only criminal offenses).
84. But see Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 222 (1953) (applying the
WSLA only to crimes involving fraud); United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 241
(1953) (noting that fraud must be an essential element of crime for the WSLA to
apply).
85. See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-
1497, slip op. at 10-11 (U.S. May 26, 2015) (applying the WSLA only to cases of
criminal offenses); Brief for Petitioner, United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co.,
710 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2013), rev'd sub nom. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v.
United States ex reL Carter, 134 S. Ct. 375 (2015) (No. 12-1497) at *36-37 (arguing
that the WSLA should apply to criminal offenses because it is in Title 18 which only
includes criminal offenses).
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suffering.., upon another person within his custody or physical control. ' 6
Congress codified this definition following the ratification of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. 8 Under a complimentary statute of limitations,
the government has eight years to prosecute those who commit crimes of
torture either domestically or abroad.88 Therefore, the statute of limitations
for torture committed in 2001, and onward, could not have expired by the
enactment of the 2008 WSLA amendment.
The lower courts' inconsistency, and the recent release of the Senate
torture report,89 creates a strong government interest for an increase in time
to end military contractor impunity. The issues began with Congress'
changing of the official definition of the term "at war," which now includes
acts of congressional approval of forces executed in the middle of a conflict
that began with the congressional approval of forces.90  Courts have
interpreted the meaning of "at war"; however, courts have not
acknowledged that, even though the term may not be certain in domestic
law, perpetrators of international crimes are still required to abide byjus in
bello (laws of war).91
Those soldiers who committed torture at Abu Ghraib were held
criminally accountable by the United States courts and military tribunals
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2014).
87. See id. (noting in history that this Act has been modified several times since
codification in 1994 following the United States' ratification of the Convention Against
Torture).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3286 (2014) (noting that eight-year statute of limitations was
codified in 1994); see 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2014) (noting that "[t]here is jurisdiction
over the activity prohibited in subsection (a) if (1) the alleged offender is a national of
the United States; or (2) the alleged offender is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender... ").
89. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMM. STUDY OF THE CIA's DETENTION
AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS (Comm. Print 2014)
(listing various cases of torture during both the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
spillover effects into other countries).
90. Cf United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 449, 455 (D. Mass. 2008)
(stating that conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan constitute war for purposes of the
WSLA).
91. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2004) (holding that the
military tribunal that was created to try Hamdan violated the Geneva Conventions
which apply during times of war). Compare Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat?
Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1, 3 (2004) (defining jus in bello as the laws of how war is conducted, including
protection of non-combatants), with Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation:
Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of
War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47, 49 (2009) (definingjus ad bellum as the laws that dictate
the entrance into conflict).
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for their participation in the violation of the laws of war.92 Since military
contractors are agents of the United States, they are also required to follow
the laws of war.93 However, because of the current state of the law, there
have been issues prosecuting military contractors for crimes committed
during times of war.94 Following the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co95 decision (holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not apply to crimes
committed abroad unless they sufficiently "touch and concern" the United
96States), the lower courts have been divided on military contractor liability
under the Alien Tort Statute. 97 The current circuit split in applying Kiobel
has left military contractors with an air of uncertainty regarding the
potential prosecution of their actions. The Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Technologies, Inc. precedent allowed the Fourth Circuit to apply the Alien
Tort Statute to hold military contractors liable for activities that touch and
concern the United States.
98
While Al Shimari theoretically allows military contractors to be held
92. See CNN Library, Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts, CNN (Nov. 7, 2014,
12:41 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-
fast-facts/ (detailing that in 2006, three years after a detainee died in Abu Ghraib, a
sergeant was found guilty for aggravated assault against inmates in Abu Ghraib).
93. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316. ("In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to
the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions .... ");
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (listing several sources that dictate that
capture is not a form of punishment but is utilized to remove soldiers from the field);
International Humanitarian Law and Private Military/Security Companies, ICRC (Oct.
12, 2013), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/pmsc-faq-150908.htm
(noting that military contractors are obligated to follow the laws of war if they take part
in military activities).
94. See Sonia Tabriz, Note, The Battlefield Preemption Doctrine: Preempting Tort
Claims Against Contractors on the Battlefield to Preserve Federal Interests in Wartime
Matters, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 629, 630-31 (2013) (arguing that all courts should adopt
Combatant Battlefield Exception as announced in Saleh v. Titan Corp., removing
crimes committed by military contractors from the hands of the court to hands of
lawmakers). But see Anupam Chander, Reflections on Kiobel: Unshackling Foreign
Corporations Kiobel's Unexpected Legacy, 107 A.J.1.L. 829, 830 (2013) (noting that
Alien Tort Claims Act can likely be applied to American corporations because they are
likely to meet the "touch and concern" requirement of Kiobel).
95. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
96. Id. at 1669.
97. Compare Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir.
2014) (holding under Kiobel, military contractors can be held liable for crimes
committed abroad), with Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding
under Kiobel that military contractors cannot be held liable for crimes committed
abroad).
98. See Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (specifying that in Al Shimari, a U.S.
military contractor, CACI, was given a contract by the U.S. Department of the Interior).
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liable for crimes, which helps combat impunity, 99 other cases heard under
statutes other than the Alien Tort Statute have faced troubling results. For
example, Saleh v. Titan Corp. provides military contractors immunity if
these men or women were not the leading commanders on the war field. 100
However, Saleh leaves room for impunity for those contractors who were
commanded by a leading military officer. 0 1 The constant back and forth
among different courts has caused great confusion between which civil
claims can be brought against military contractors and which claims are
ineligible.' 
0 2
C. Al Shimari a la Carte: Is Torture Too Much to Bargain for Under
the WSLA?
Based on a plain reading of the WSLA, the Act can be applied to
military contractors who commit crimes outside of pecuniary fraud, too.
The facts presented by Al Shimari show that military contractors committed
an offence-torture, a crime according to Title 18."3 When one individual
subjects another to genital beatings or to being tasered in the head, then the
actions serve no other purpose than to cause severe physical pain or harm
to an individual.1 4 Here, the individuals subject to these conditions were
the prisoners at Abu Ghraib; therefore, they were under the custody of the
CACI interrogators.' 05  Thus, CACI interrogators' actions constituted an
offense under the WSLA because CACI's actions fulfill both elements of
torture.
Second, to meet the first portion of the WSLA's third subsection, it is
99. Contra Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-00827-GBL-JFA,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107511, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. 2015) (holding that when the facts
require the court to question military decisions, the court does not have jurisdiction to
decide the claim).
100. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9.
101. See id. (holding that those in leadership positions are responsible for crimes
committed).
102. See id. (following the decision, In re KBR, Inc., which was vacated and
remanded by Metzgar v. KBR Inc., 744 F.3d 326, 351-52 (2014)).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2014) (noting that the WSLA is located in Title 18); Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 521-22 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating
that CACI employees, including interrogators, committed or ordered acts of torture in
Abu Ghraib).
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (defining torture to include "an act.., intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering... "); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 521-22
(listing various methods of torture used against Iraqis detained in Abu Ghraib, such as
prisoners being shot with guns, forced to perform sexual acts, raped, or forced to watch
rape, among other unapproved torture methods).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (requiring custody as a necessary element of torture); Al
Shimari, 758 F.3d at 521-22 (noting that custody includes not having freedom to
leave).
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necessary to look at the second "or" list. The second "or" list provides for
a choice between "any contract, subcontract, or purchase order .... 06 Al
Shimari notes, in its facts, that CACI was under contract to provide
interrogation services to the military, which it was in the process of
performing during Abu Ghraib. 10 7 Thus, CACI committed torture during
the performance of its contract with the Department of Interior.'0 CACI's
crimes, therefore, fit the application of the third prong of the WSLA. 0 9
The final portion of the third subsection is less obviously applicable than
the first two portions of subsection A because, based on the facts, there
seemed to be no obvious connection between the third subsection and the
facts."1 ° However, Al Shimari noted that the government hired CACI
because there was a "shortage of trained military interrogators[j"''I and the
government required the interrogators to yield information for the war
effort. 12 CACI received the contract because the war required interrogator
services, relating the contract to the performance of the war.1 3 Therefore,
the WSLA can be applied to a military contractor's torture that holds
military contractors criminally liable.
The Supreme Court limited the application of the WSLA to criminal
offenses. However, the Court did not define the term "at war," which has
changed over time. Therefore, it is likely the WSLA could apply torture
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2008) (identifying quoted list).
107. AiShimari, 758 F.3d at 521-22.
108. See id. (limiting the third prong to crimes committed during multiple stages of
a government contract including performance of contract); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at
521-22 (finding CACI was performing under a government contract, providing
interrogators, while working in Abu Ghraib).
109. See 18 U.S.C. 3287 (identifying that the third prong states that offenses must
be "committed in connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance,
payment for, interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or settlement, of any
contract, subcontract, or purchase order which is connected with or related to the
prosecution of the war"); id. at 521-22 (articulating that CACI was given contract by
the U.S. government).
110. See 18 U.S.C. 3287 (limiting offenses to those that are "connected with or
related to the prosecution of the war or directly connected with or related to the
authorized use of the Armed Forces, or with any disposition of termination inventory
by any war contractor... "); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 521-22 (highlighting the facts
include the purpose of employing CACI, which was to provide interrogation services to
the American military).
111. AlShimari, 758 F.3dat 521.
112. See id. (highlighting that individuals held at Abu Ghraib were thought to have
information about insurgent groups and therefore required the use of skilled
interrogators).
113. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (covering crimes committed during authorized
uses of military force); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 521 (noting CACI investigators were
instructed by military to torture).
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committed during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts because torture is a
criminal offense, and the statute of limitations had not run when Congress
amended WSLA.
III. THE FUTURE OF MILITARY CONTRACTORS: IMMUNITY AND A BLANK
CHECK OR JUSTICE?
The future of military contractor liability is still uncertain pending a
Supreme Court decision further interpreting the WSLA or clarifying the
applicability of the Alien Tort Claims Act.
A. The Courts Should Seek to Apply Justice, Not Spread Impunity
The government is not currently holding military contractors liable for
crimes they committed during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. 
14
However, to move forward, "transitional justice measures-such as
criminal prosecutions of perpetrators of atrocities-can be crucial tools to
prevent the recurrence of cycles of violence."' 1 5 Prosecution is a clear
deterrent to potential perpetrators noting that they may violate the law, but
they will not get away without punishment.' 116
Holding military contractors liable for the crimes committed by their
employees is not likely to cause a negative backlash.'1 7 If the government
holds contractors liable for their actions abroad, they will change their
behavior so that they continue to receive government contracts in the
future.'" However, contractors may also seek to limit their liability by
negotiating indemnification clauses into their contracts with the
government.1 1 9 Ultimately, though, even if military contractors are held
114. See In re KBR, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 752, 772-73 (D. Md. 2013) (holding
military contractors exempt from liability for practical and policy reasons); Saleh v.
Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that Alien Tort Statute does not
apply to military contractors).
115. David Tolbert, EU Must Protect Bosnia's War Crimes Court, INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.ictj.org/news/eu-must-
protect-bosnia's-war-crimes-court.
116. See generally id. (arguing that prosecuting war crimes is a clear deterrent).
117. Cf Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (2009) (concluding that military contractors should be held
liable under respondeat superior doctrine).
118. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.209-5(a)(1)(i)(B) (2006) (stating that a contractor bidding
on a government contract has not "within a three-year period preceding this offer, been
convicted of or had a civil judgment rendered against them for: commission of fraud or
a criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a
public ... contract or subcontract... ").
119. See VIVIAN S. CHU & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41755,
TORT SUITS AGAINST FEDERAL CONTRACTORS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL ISSUES,
REP. 22 (2001) (arguing that contractors could potentially make government
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liable, they will not shy away from government contracts because of their
profitability. 1
20
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the WSLA applies to
offenses whose statutes of limitations had not expired in 2008, when the
Act was amended. However, the court in United States v. BNP Paribas
held that if the statute of limitations had not yet expired when the crime and
war otherwise meet all the provisions of a modified tolling statute, then that
tolling statute should apply.' 2' While at first blush it seems that allowing
the 2008 WSLA to apply to offenses committed prior to its enactment
would violate the ban on ex post facto laws, it actually does not because
those laws focus on not holding someone liable for an action that was not
defined to be criminal at the time it was committed. 22 In addition to the
holding in United States v. BNP Paribas, United States v. Prosperi made it
very clear that, because Congress had not limited war to declared wars by
using the term "declared" in the statute, a broader reading of the term at
war was appropriate. 23 The courts should apply the 2008 amendment to
Carter by following the Prosperi court's test and thus deem the Iraq
conflict a war under the WSLA.
124
responsible to pay damages through an indemnification clause but contractors still hold
liability).
120. See Samuel Weigley, 10 Companies Profitting the Most From War, USA
TODAY (Mar. 10, 2013, 6:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/20
13/03/10/10-companies-profiting-most-from-war/1970997/ (describing the massive
profitability of war. For example, L-3 Communications made $956 million in 2010-
11.); see also Angelo Young, And the Winner for the Most Iraq War Contract is KBR,
With $39.5 Billion in a Decade, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2013, 10:13 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/winner-most-iraq-war-contracts-kbr-395-billion-decade-
1135905 (noting that KBR received many of its contracts without competition to total
$39.5 billion with the next highest recipient of government contract funds at $13.5
billion).
121. See United States v. BNP Paribas, 884 F. Supp. 2d 589, 603, 608 (S.D. Tex.
2012) (holding that if a statute of limitations has not expired when a law is modified,
the modified law applies).
122. See id. (reasoning that the statute of limitations had not expired so the
application of the law is not necessarily ex post facto); United States v. Prosperi, 573 F.
Supp. 2d 436, 443-44, 446 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting a list of factors to consider when
determining whether a conflict constitutes as war for the purpose of the WSLA).
123. See id. at 605-06 (mentioning that the terms Congress uses in a statute are the
terms Congress intended, including omission of words).
124. See id. at 607 (identifying that the Prosperi court created a factors-balancing
test: "(1) the extent of the authorization given by Congress to the President to act; (2)
whether the conflict is deemed a "war" under accepted definitions of the term and the
rules of international law; (3) the size and scope of the conflict (including the cost of
the related procurement effort); and (4) the diversion of resources that might have been
expanded on investigation frauds against the government").
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B. "I'll take 'Certainty 'for 100, " Chief Justice Roberts
The Supreme Court should take additional WSLA cases because, to
achieve certainty that military contractors will be prosecuted for crimes
they commit while performing contracts, it is necessary to clarify lower
court circuit splits and inconsistencies on this issue. 125 To do this, the
Supreme Court can take the next lower court case that discusses military
contractor liability for serious crimes committed during the Afghanistan or
Iraq conflicts. Alternatively, Congress can pass a law that removes any
possible ambiguity that military contractors are indeed held liable for the
crimes they commit abroad, during times of war, where these actions are
not necessary for the successful performance of their contract.
Lastly, the Court should apply the plain meaning interpretation of the
WSLA to extend the reach of the Act. The third prong of the WSLA has
not been considered or applied in any lower court case.1 26 However, based
on the analysis in Part II of this Comment, it is useful for expanding upon
offenses eligible to utilize the WSLA's tolling mechanism.127 Applying the
third prong in this test could give the courts or Congress sufficient time to
work out all the noted issues with military contractor liability because it
will extend the commencement of the tolling of the statute of limitations.
Ultimately, the collective goal of the courts and Congress should be to hold
military contractors liable in both civil and criminal respects for the crimes
they commit while performing contracts abroad during wartime. Military
contractors will then be sure to know that if they commit certain crimes,
they will be held liable.
125. Compare Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir.
2014) (holding that Kiobel does not automatically preclude all liability cases against
military contractors), with In re KBR, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d at 772-73 (advocating for
the inability of suits to be brought against military contractors who commit crimes
during performance of their contracts), and Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 (noting that military
contractors should be automatically exempt from liability).
126. See generally United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171 (4th
Cir. 2013) rev'd sub nom. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Carter, No. 12-1497 (U.S. argued Jan. 13, 2015) (excluding discussion of third prong of
the WSLA); see generally United States v. BNP Paribas, 884 F. Supp. 2d 589, 589
(S.D. Tex. 2012) (analyzing False Claims Act); see generally United States v. Prosperi,
573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 436 (D. Mass. 2008) (focusing on term "at war"); United States v.
Grainger, 346 U.S. 235 (1953) (holding that crimes must be pecuniary in nature, but
ignoring the third prong of the WSLA); Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953)
(discussing whether a false statement would trigger the WSLA under the second prong
of the WSLA and not the third prong).
127. See discussion supra Part II.B (listing Supreme Court cases that have
evaluated the WSLA); Part II.C (identifying lower court cases that have evaluated the
WSLA); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2012) (identifying options for types of offenses
that the WSLA covers).
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CONCLUSION
Today, the United States is on the brink of potentially setting an
unfortunate example for the world. Currently, the United States continues
to be haunted by the torture committed by military contractors: torture that
was sanctioned and deliberately hidden by the CIA. The Supreme Court's
decisions in 2015 could shape future military contractor liability in a
negative or positive manner. A plain meaning interpretation allows the
courts to expand the WSLA to address the rampant impunity and
uncertainty of prosecution of military contractors who commit crimes
during times of war. 128 The current precedent allows military contractors to
be relatively free from prosecution.129 When potential war criminals are
uncertain about whether or not they government will prosecute them, there
is less deterrence to keep the potential war criminals from committing
crimes.' 30 Because torture is included in the same title as the WSLA, the
Act should include all crimes enumerated in the same Title 18.131
This current state of affairs can be reformed if the Supreme Court adopts
a plain meaning interpretation of the WSLA. The plain meaning
interpretation will adapt the Act to crimes such as military contractors' acts
of torture committed during times of war. Ultimately, military contractors
are hired to do a job and do it successfully; committing crimes such as
fraud or torture means military contractors are not performing their
contracts successfully. For the United States to be able to move forward
with preventing future infractions, the Court must seal the impunity gap for
military contractors.
128. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that the WSLA as a whole is
unambiguous and, therefore, a plain meaning reading is permissible).
129. See discussion supra Part IV (noting that various statutes do not consistently
hold military contractors accountable, which leads to impunity).
130. See discussion supra Part IV.B (pointing to uncertainty for the lack of
deterrence).
131. See discussion supra Part II1.B (mentioning that some offenses in Title 18 are
civil while others are criminal and, therefore, that the WSLA should apply to both).
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Erratum
Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Innovator's Dilemma, 4 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev.
371 (2015).
In our Volume 4 Issue 3, we mistakenly omitted Professor Max Stul
Oppenheimer's middle name in his article, The Innovator's Dilemma, on
the title page and in later footnotes. We would like to extend our apologies
to the author, and we would like to note that, at this time, we have
corrected the omission on the online databases and on our website.
